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Farr: Appeal and Error--Decree "Adjudicating the Principles of the Caus

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
APPEAL AND

OF THE CAUSE"

ERROR - DECREE "ADJUDICATING THE PRINCIPLES
- DECREE DISMISSING A SUIT IN EQUITY WITH

Plaintiff instituted a suit in equity
On
to subject certain property to a contractual indebtedness.
demurrer, the chancellor was of opinion that the plaintiff had
shown no ground for equity jurisdiction, and dismissed the bill
without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to have the cause transferred to the law side of the court under the statute.' On appeal,
it was contended that this decree was not final, because the statute
enabled the plaintiff to have the cause transferred to law and tried
there, so that the decree was not appealable. Held: The decree was
final as to the equitable jurisdiction of the trial court, and was
appealable as a decree "adjudicating the principles of the cause"!
Murray v. Price.
The purpose of allowing the transfer of causes from one
forum to the other is not to do away with the distinction between
law and equity." The court is not under a duty to transfer a
cause on its own motion,' nor to recast the pleadings after such a
transfer." Nor is it authorized to hear law and chancery causes
together.' The purpose of the statute authorizing such a transfer
was to test the practicability of code pleading in a modified form."
In equity, its use has been confined to cases where this is the most

LEAVE TO TRANSFER TO LAW. -

1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 4, § 11, "No case shall be dismissed
simply because it was brought on the wrong side of the court, but whenever it shall appear that a plaintiff has proceeded at law when he should
have proceeded in equity, or in equity when he should have proceeded at law,
the court shall direct a transfer to the proper forum, and shall order such
change in, or amendment of, the pleadings as may be necessary to conform
them to the proper practice; and without such direction, any party to the
suit shall have the right, at any stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings
so as to obviate the objection that his suit or action was not brought on the
right side of the court."
This statute was copied from VA. CODE (1919) §
6084.
2
W. VA. REV. CODS (1931) c. 58, art. 5, § 1(g), authorizes an appeal "in any
case in chancery wherein there is a decree or order . . . . adjudicating the
principles of the cause". This statute was taken from VA. CODE (1860) c.

182, § 2.
8172 S. E. 541 (W. Va. 1933).
'Conway v. American Nat. Bank of Danville, 146 Va. 357, 131 S. E. 803
(1926).
5
Conway v. American Nat. Bank of Danville, supra n. 4.
8
French et al. v. Stange Mining Co. et al, 133 Va. 602, 114 S. E. 121
(1922).
v. American Nat. Bank of Danville, supra n. 4.
"Conway
8
Burks, "The Code of 1919", 5 VA. L. REG. (n. s.) 97, 120 (1919).
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practical method of remanding the plaintiff to the law court; and
it will not be applied when the result would be a misjoinder of
causes ° of of parties0 in the action at law. A transfer to the law
side of the court will not be given when the interests of the parties
have been protected by an issue out of chancery with the same
result as a trial by jury at law, even though there should have
been a transfer." Since the statute is primarily for the benefit of
the plaintiff rather than the defendant, the plaintiff can waive
his right to transfer the cause, or suffer a dismissal rather than
to proceed at law.' In an action at law, the plaintiff can prevent
a transfer to equity when the only purpose is to allow the defendant to assert a defense available only in equity."'
The purpose of authorizing an appeal from a decree adjudicating the principles of the cause is to enable a party to have
an appellate review of the case without waiting for the final decree, but the statute does not extend the classification of appealable decrees indefinitely.? To be appealable the decree must adjudicate all of the principles of the cause raised by the pleadings
or otherwise, in the sense of settling every right" of each party
to the suit. It is sufficient that the decree impliedly settle these
0 Brame

v. Guarantee Finance Co., 139 Va. 394, 124 S. E. 477 (1924).
20French et al. v. Stange Mining Co. et al., supra n. 6.
I Sacks et al. v. Theodore, 136 Va. 466, 118 S. E. 105 (1923) (The trial
court committed the error of setting the verdict aside, so the case was dismissed on appeal, which forced the plaintiff to go to law, after all).
12
French et al. v. Stange Mining Co. et al., supra n. 6; Thomas Andrews
& Co. v. Robinson et al., 155 Va. 362, 154 S. E. 154 (1930). (The plaintiff
waived his right to a transfer by not seeking it until after the appeal from
the trial court); Nash v. Harmon, et ux., 148 Va. 610, 139 S. E. 273 (1927)
(In a proper case, the statute is mandatory until the right is waived).
13
French et al. v. Stange Mining Co. et al., supra n. 6. (The plaintiff
stood on his bill, and waiver of right to a transfer was an alternate ground
for the decision).
"Dexter-Portland Cement Co. v. Acme Supply Co. Inc., 147 Va. 758, 133
S. E. 788 (1926).
wShirey v. Musgrave, 29 W. Va. 131, 144, 11 S. E. 914 (1886).
1
Shlirey v. Musgrave, supra n. 15, (The decree left unsettled the amount
and existence of part of the liens sought to be enforced, and awaited the
joining additional parties before settling these claims); Hill v. Als et als,
27 W. Va. 215 (1885) (Suit to subject property to a judgment and determine priority of liens, and held not appealable decree, for it left open the
priority of the liens); Shinn v. Shinn, 105 W. Va. 246, 249, 142 S. E. 63
(1928) (Decree held not appealable for it only ordered partition of certain
lands, and did not dissolve the partnership, which was one purpose of the
suit); Kinkead v. Securo, 112 W. Va. 671, 166 S. E. 382 (1932) (Decree
merely ordering a reference to ascertain facts is not appealable).
17 Laidiey v. Kline's Admrt et al., 21 W. Va. 21 (1882); Shirey v. Musgrave, supra n. 16; Blackshere v. Blackshere, 111 W. Va. 213, 215, 161 S.
E. 27, 28, ("Finality of decree, in the sense that all issues must be decided,
is required before an appeal can be obtained in those instances which involve
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rights,' but the mere opinion of the chancellor with no decree
adjudicating them is not enough." For an appeal it is not necessary that there be an actual enforcement of the relief sought," or
that the principles adjudicated be applied to the facts of the case . '
But there must be a decree putting these principles into effeet, for
otherwise the appellant has suffered no prejudice.'
Both of the statutes in question were taken from the Code
of Virginia, but they were not there construed together until
after West Virginia had adopted the statute authorizing the transfer of causes from one forum to the other. In Virginia it has
been held that a decree dismissing a suit in equity, with leave to
transfer the cause to the law court, is not final, but it is appealable as a decree adjudicating the principles of the cause?' Since
the effect of such a decree is to deny to the plaintiff all of the
relief sought in his bill, the case seems to be correct in the light
of both precedent and principle.
-PAUL D. FARR.

INSURANCE - FORFEITURE OF POLICY INSANITY NOT AN
EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY INSURER AS TO TOTAL DISABILITY.

- An insurance policy provided that, upon the insured's giving
notice of total disability before default in payment of premiums,
further payment thereof would be ,excused during the disability.
The insured was adjudged insane previous to the due date of a
premium. While so incapacitated, the period of grace expired,
that portion of subsection 1, which allows an appeal to any decree or order
'adjudicating
the principles of the cause' ").
18
Reed v. Cline's Heirs, 9 Gratt. 136 (1852) (Bill to enforce a title bond
for sale of land, and after statute of limitations pleaded, court directed an
issue to try whether the bond had been executed and lost. Held, that this
impliediy adjudicates the plaintiff's right, as not barred by the statute of

limitations).

"Armstrong v. Ross, 56 W. Va. 16, 48 S. E. 475 (1904).
2Richmond v. Richmond, 62 W. Va. 206, 57 S. E. 736 (1907) (The decree ordered partition of certain lands, but the actual partition had not been
made).
2Wood et at. v. Harmison et aL, 41 W. Va. 376, 23 S. E. 560 (1895).
'Garrett v. Garrett et als., 91 W. Va. 243, 112 S. E. 494 (1922) (The
decree sustained a demurrer to an affirmative answer, but did not dismiss
the answer or give any relief sought in the bill); Watson v. Wigginton, 28
W. Va. 533, 552 (1886) (The trial court may correct the errors committed,
or commit others, before enforcing the decree); Steenrod v. Railroad Co.,
25 W. Va. 133 (1884).
'Colvin et at. v. Butler, 150 Va, 672, 143 S. E. 333 (1928) ; Hodges & De
Jarnette v. Thornton et al.,
138 Va. 112, 120 S. E. 865 (1924).
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